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I] 
IL ARGU.\1E~T II\' REPLY 
BECAUSE THE DISTRICT COURT ·wocLD HAVE ERRED 
IN DENYING A MOTION TO SUPPRESS MR. LEONARD'S CONFESSION, 
MR. LEONARD PROVED HE RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL FOR HIS ATTORNEY'S FAILURE TO FILE SUCH A MOTION 
A detective transported Philip Leonard to the police station so he could submit to a 
polygraph examination regarding his alleged contact with an underage girl. NPD Report Dated 
1-8-2009, p. 3. A second detective advised Mr. Leonard of his rights pursuant to .Miranda and he 
"agreed to take the polygraph, but said he did not want to discuss anything after the polygraph." 
Id. Despite the express limitation on his Miranda waiver, the detective asked Mr. Leonard if he 
wanted to know "how the test went and wanted to know what the test results were and talk about 
it" and Mr. Leonard said that he did. Id. Both detectives confronted Mr. Leonard with the fact 
that he failed the polygraph, told him that they knew he was not telling the truth and in light of 
that failure and the other evidence against him, "it was not looking good for his part." Id. 
Mr. Leonard then invoked his right to counsel. Although the detectives discontinued 
questioning, they told Mr. Leonard that it was necessary for his attorney to contact them 
"immediately." When Mr. Leonard and the detective arrived at Mr. Leonard's residence, Mr. 
Leonard inquired how an attorney could be appointed to assist him since he could not afford one. 
The detective then misinformed Mr. Leonard that no attorney could be appointed until he was 
arrested, thus communicating it would be impossible for an attorney to contact the detective 
immediately as he said was necessary. The detective transported Mr. Leonard back to the police 
station where he submitted to further interrogation without an attorney present. 
These circumstances establish that Mr. Leonard's confession was taken without a valid 
waiver of his previously invoked right to counsel. Thus, had trial counsel filed a motion to 
suppress, that motion should have been granted and Mr. Leonard's confession could not have 
been used against him at trial. With this critical evidence suppressed, there is a reasonable 
probability that but for counsel's failure to file the motion to suppress, the outcome of the case 
would have been different. Accordingly, Mr. Leonard has proven that he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
According to the state, Mr. Leonard "asserts that he was in custody because he spoke to 
police while at the police station, received Miranda warnings prior to a polygraph examination, 
and was given rides between the police station and his home by an officer" and that "mere 
presence at a police station while talking to police is not the equivalent of formal arrest of 
Miranda." Respondent's Brief, p. 6. However, as noted in Mr. Leonard's Opening Brief, those 
are not the only factors that contributed to Mr. Leonard's custodial status. See also State v. 
Medrano, 123 Idaho 114, 117, 844 P .2d 1364, 1367 (Ct. App. 1992) (fact that accused went to 
the police station voluntarily and the officer told him that he was not under arrest are not 
dis positive of the question of lvfiranda custody). 
In addition to being transported to the police station and being given Miranda warnings, 
Mr. Leonard submitted to a polygraph, which a reasonable person would find quite intimidating 
under any circumstances and in Mr. Leonard's case, it was prefaced by highly personal questions. 
More significantly, after the test, the two detectives disregarded Mr. Leonard's earlier attempt to 
limit the scope of his waiver and then confronted Mr. Leonard, told him he was lying and that 
with all the evidence they had, things were not looking good. A reasonable person in these 
circumstances would believe his freedom was restricted to a degree associated with arrest at the 
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time Mr. Leonard invoked his right to counsel. See also Appellant's Brief, p. 10. 
The state further argues that even if Mr. Leonard was in custody when he invoked his 
right to counsel, he waived that right by requesting to return to the police station and give his 
statement. However. even if Mr. Leonard reinitiated communications on the ride back to his 
house, that fact does not necessarily suffice to show a waiver of the previously asserted right to 
counsel as the inquiries arc "separate, and clarity of application is not gained by melding them 
together." See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045 (1983). 
Mr. Leonard explained the reasons that his "request" to return to the police station in 
order to confess did not constitute a valid waiver of his previously invoked right to counsel at 
pages eleven to fifteen of his Opening Brief. The state does not offer any meaningful argument 
in response and thus no reply is warranted. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons set forth above and in Mr. Leonard's Opening Brief, he respectfully 
asks this Court to reverse the district court's judgment denying his post-conviction claims and to 
remand this case for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this n day ofNovember, 2012. 
, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
~obyn Fyffe 
Attorney for Phillip Leonard Jr. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this.?7day of November, 2012, I caused two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing to be mailed to: Office of the Attorney General, P.O. Box 83720, 
Boise, ID 83720-0010. 
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